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Abstract 
Our context involves  Cournot oligopolists producing N M  products at constant marginal costs 
when preferences are quasi-linear.  We identify relationships between second moments of unit 
costs and second moments of firm-level production.  For example, a larger variance in unit costs 
of a product increases own output variance and the variance of any other output.  We also 
investigate how second moments of unit costs affect industry cost efficiency.  Industry costs can 
rise if the wrong firm secures a cost reduction.  For quadratic preferences, it is shown that 
Zhao’s (2001) share criteria for an increase in unit costs to increase welfare extend to the multi-
product setting. 
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1.  Introduction 
Curiosities abound concerning the comparative statics of cost for the standard Cournot 
model in which a single homogeneous good is produced at a constant firm-specific unit cost.  
Seade (1985), for example, has shown that Cournot oligopolists can gain from an excise tax 
whereas competitive firms and monopolists cannot.  Among these curiosities, our interest 
concerns two.  One is that, as observed by Bergstrom and Varian (1985), a sum-preserving 
increase in the variance of these unit costs decreases industry costs if the set of active firms does 
not change.  This observation has generated a growing body of research regarding what are 
referred to as cost manipulation games, see Salant and Shaffer (1999) and Van Long and 
Soubeyran (1997, 2001, 2005).  The second curiosity, initially identified by Lahiri and Ono 
(1988), is that assistance to a small firm can reduce social welfare.  This is because smaller 
active firms are socially inefficient since the largest firm (if it does indeed have unlimited 
capacity to produce at its given unit cost) should produce all that is consumed under social 
efficiency.  Février and Linnemer (2004) have generalized the observation to quite arbitrary cost 
shocks while Zhao (2001) and Wang and Zhao (2007) have provided explicit conditions in 
particular cases. 
These two peculiarities are, of course, related.  When the unit cost of a high cost firm 
increases, then mean unit cost increases and the variance of unit costs increases.  The effect on 
mean unit cost should reduce welfare, but that on variance should increase welfare.  If the firm is 
small enough, then the latter dominates since more efficient firms pick up some of the smaller 
firm’s decline in output and the efficiency gap is large enough.  With two exceptions, those of 
Lapan and Hennessy (2006) and Wang and Zhao (2007), the literature to date has not extended 
the analysis to the case of multi-product oligopoly.  Lapan and Hennessy study the implications 
of cost correlation structures for welfare in two- and three-product Cournot oligopoly.  Wang and 
Zhao (2007) consider the case of product differentiation in the (linear) Bertrand-Shubik model.  
The general intent of the present work is to look at how the moments of unit costs affect 
equilibrium in multi-product Cournot oligopoly, subject to the standard assumption that income 
effects and other consumer-side heterogeneities do not matter.  Our first set of results, given in 
Section 2, establishes relationships between unit cost moments and output moments.  A sample 
inference is what one might call a law of own variance equilibrium response: the variance of any 
output across firms must increase with the unit cost variance for that output.  This is true 
regardless of how the output interacts in demand with other goods.  A less intuitive result is that 
the variance in output for good A must increase with the variance of unit costs for good B.  
Similarly, the covariance between two outputs must increase with the unit cost covariance 
between those two outputs. 
The effects of cost moments on social welfare are considered in sections 3 and 4.  It is found 
that an increase in a cost covariance increases (decreases) the sum of firm profits while leaving 
consumer surplus unaffected whenever goods complement (substitute).  Concerning how an 
increase in mean unit costs might change welfare, the case of quadratic preferences is studied.  
Then the introduction of plural markets does not affects Zhao’s (2001) criteria for when an 
increase in the unit cost of a small firm increases industry profits and when it increases social 
welfare.  Social welfare increases with an increase in some firm’s unit cost of production in a 
given market whenever the firm’s output share in that market is smaller than , where 
 is the number of multi-market firms.  The paper concludes with a brief review. 
2 /( 1)N +
N
 
2.  Model 
The model involves M  markets and  firms, where each firm is active in all markets.N 1  On 
                                                 
1 The results we will establish need to be modified when not all firms are active in all markets.  
Further analyses to accommodate firms inactive in some markets are available from the authors 
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the demand side there are  price-taking consumers, H {1,2, ... , } Hh H∈ = Ω .  Availability of 
goods is denoted by 1( , ... , )
tr
MX X X=  where mX  is the aggregate amount of the mth good 
available and the superscripted tr identifies the transpose operation.  With prices ( ),mP X m∈  
MΩ , with I  as aggregate income, and with ( )
M
mm
z I P X X∈Ω= − m∑  as the numeraire good, we 
assume the existence of a representative consumer where the utility function is2
  (2.1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
M
mm
V z U X I U X P X X∈Ω= + = + −∑ m
and  is an increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously differentiable function. ( )U X
Upon optimizing in (2.1), inverse demand functions are identified as  
.
( ) ( ) /m mP X U X X= ∂ ∂
( )mU X≡ 3  Letting 2 ( ) / ( )ij i j ijA U X X X U X≡ ∂ ∂ ∂ ≡  be entries in the aggregate utility 
function’s Hessian matrix, we may describe demand system comparative statics as4  
 
1
11 12 11 1 1
12 22 22 2 2
1 2
;
M
M
M M MMM M M
A A AdX dP dU
A A AdX dP dU
B B B
A A AdX dP dU
;
−⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟= = = ⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
"
"
# # % ## # #
"
⎟⎟
                                                                                                                                                            
 (2.2) 
 
upon request.  
2 See Chapter 3 in Vives (1999) for a comprehensive discussion of this preference structure.  It is 
assumed in the standard one-market oligopoly model, so that income effects do not enter as a 
consideration when specifying aggregate demand. 
3 Rather than intersperse usage of both  and , we intend to use  in the 
main.  We will use  when price needs to be emphasized in conveying a point.  
( )mP X ( )mU X ( )mU X
( )mP X
4 Since complementarity and substitution interactions on the demand side are important when 
seeking to understand equilibrium in our model, some words of caution are warranted.  Function 
 conveys how the inverse demand for the ith good changes as ( )ij ijU U X= jX  increases, holding 
all other goods fixed.  Function ( )ij ijB B P=  conveys how the demand for the ith good changes 
as  changes, holding all other prices fixed.  Thus, a complementarity (resp., substitution) 
interaction in the sense of demand functions may or may not support that respective interaction 
in the sense of inverse demand functions.  Both notions of interaction are consistent for the two-
product system, but are not necessarily consistent when three or more products enter 
jP
( )U ⋅ .  
Throughout the manuscript, we will seek to clarify what we mean when we assert the nature of a 
demand side interaction. 
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or dX  where BdP= B  has entries labeled msB .  The linear-in-income preference structure 
ensures that there are no income effects; Hicksian and Marshallian demand functions are the 
same.5   
In N-firm oligopoly, the nth firm with constant unit production costs , chooses 
outputs 
,nmc m∈ΩM
n
mx , to maximize profit  
( ) .
M
n
m mm
U X c xπ ∈Ω ⎡= −⎣∑ n nm⎤⎦
N
 (2.3) 
Nash first-order optimality conditions are6  
( ) ( ) 0 , .
M
n n
m m ms s Ms
U X c U X x m n∈Ω− + = ∀ ∈Ω ∀ ∈Ω∑  (2.4) 
Throughout we make some standard assumptions: 
Assumption 1.  A unique pure-strategy interior solution exists to the N M×  system in (2.4). 
 
Production values in this solution are indicated as ,*nmx .
7  The reader’s appendix shows that  
 ,* ,* ,* *; ;
M
n n n n n
i im m i i i m mm
;n mB x x c cδ ε δ ε∈Ω≡ ≡ −∑ ≡ −  (2.5) 
where * ,*(1/ )
N
n
m mn
N x∈Ω≡ ∑ and x (1/ ) N nm mnc N c∈Ω≡ ∑ .  The product of a firm’s production 
deviations is  
 ( )( ),* ,* .
M M M M
n n n n n n
i j im m js s im js m sm s m s
B B B Bδ δ ε ε∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω= =∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ε ε
                                                
 (2.6) 
If we define the covariance of unit costs for goods m and s across firms as  Covcms =
 
5 See footnote 2 above.  With income effects, then B  is not symmetric.  This would weaken 
somewhat some of our results. 
6 We note in passing that a firm may be viewed as producing at under marginal cost if 
 when evaluated at an equilibrium.  This is more likely when goods 
complement in the sense of , and  is high.  Of course, price cannot 
be less than marginal cost for all goods since this would mean negative profits in our model. 
( ) 0
M
n
ms ss
U X x∈Ω ≥∑
0 , ,ms MU m s m≥ ∀ ∈Ω ≠ s nmc
7 Chapter 3 in Okuguchi and Szidarovszky (1990) provides conditions under which a unique 
pure-strategy solution exists.  Uniqueness is the more problematic of the two concerns.  
Szidarovszky and Li (2000) identify conditions under which local stability is guaranteed when 
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(1/ )
N
n n
m sn
N ε ε∈Ω∑ , and the covariance of outputs for goods i and j across firms as Cov xij =  
,* ,*(1/ )
N
n n
i jn
N δ δ∈Ω∑ , then an interchange of summation signs confirms  
 1Cov Cov .
N M M M M
x n n c
ij im js m s im js msn m s m s
B B B B
N
ε ε∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω= =∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  (2.7) 
This implies  
 
Cov
,
Cov
x
ij
im js is jmc
ms
B B B B
∂ = +∂  (2.8) 
or 
Proposition 1.  Assume multi-product Cournot oligopoly with constant marginal costs, 
representative consumer utility of form (2.1), and a unique interior solution.  Then the response 
of output covariances to unit cost covariances can be written as  
 
Cov
;
Cov
x
ijm s t
im js is jm kt ktc
i j ms k
P P PB ;
X X X
η η η η η∂ = + =∂  (2.9) 
where ktη  is the Hicksian (and Marshallian) elasticity of demand.   
 
The proposition’s contents are best illustrated through identifying some implications. 
Corollary 1.1.  Under the assumptions in Proposition 1, (a) Cov / Cov 0x cii mm∂ ∂ ≥ ; (b) 
; (c) Cov / Cov 0x cij ij∂ ∂ ≥ Cov / Cov
sign
x c
ii is isη∂ ∂ = − ; (d) Cov / Cov
sign
x c
im mm imη∂ ∂ = − ; (e) Cov / Covx cij ms∂ ∂  
Cov / Covx cim js is jm ms ijB B B B≡ + ≡ ∂ ∂  (as im miB B≡ ). 
 
Part (a) shows that variance of output ,*nix  across firms must increase with an increase in the 
variance of unit costs for any output.  Consider the consequences for concentration in the mth 
market, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, ,* * 2( / )
N
n
m mn
x X∈Ω∑  with  *mX =
                                                                                                                                                             
adjustments occur according to adaptive expectations. 
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,*
N
n
mn
x∈Ω∑ .  Since aggregate output does not change when unit cost sums are held fixed, the 
concentration index for each market must increase whenever the variance of unit costs increases 
in any market.  In part (b), and bearing in mind that we have controlled for unit cost variances, a 
stronger correlation between unit costs leads to a stronger correlation between firm outputs 
regardless of how the markets interact in demand.   
To rationalize part (a), suppose 0imη <  so that goods complement in demand in the direct (as 
distinct from inverse) demand sense.  Then an increase in the variance of  should induce more 
dispersion in the 
n
mc
,*n
ix  to the extent that it induces more dispersion in the 
,*n
mx .  The large firms 
should tend to expand in both products while the small firms should tend to contract in both 
products.  Suppose instead that 0imη >  so that firms with low (high) values of  tend to have 
low (high) values of 
n
mc
,*n
ix .  While the alignment is reversed, it is still true that an increase in the 
variance of  should induce more dispersion in the nmc
,*n
ix .  In this case a low value of  that 
falls further will tend to be associated with low values of 
n
mc
,*n
ix  and to induce a further decline in 
these values.  So while the sign of imη  will determine how the individual ,*nix  values change in 
response to a change in , it is irrelevant in determining the sign of Covcmm Cov / Cov
x c
ii mm∂ ∂ .  Part 
(b) can be motivated by a similar argument.   
Regarding parts (c) and (d), consider Cov / Covx cim mm∂ ∂  and suppose 0imη <  so that there is a 
complementary relation in the direct demand sense.  Then firms with low (high) values of  
tend to have high (low) values of 
n
mc
,*n
ix .  An increase in the variance of  should induce a 
stronger covariance in outputs because it induces more dispersion in the 
n
mc
,*n
mx , with more 
dispersed marginal revenues for the other market.  A similar argument applies for part (c).  Part 
(e) has an analog in dual demand theory in that it identifies some of the behavioral symmetries 
that demand system integrability requires.  
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In general, little can be said when no coordinates among the index quintuple ( ,  in 
(2.9) are the same.  For two situations, however, we show that some more structure identifies 
strong implications.  For one situation, suppose the dual expenditure function for  is of 
weakly separable form .  Thus, prices  and 
, , )i j m s
( )U X
[ ( , , ... ), ( , , ... ), ... ]A Bi j m sC c P P c P P iP jP  are in group 
A and prices  and mP sP  are in group B.  Then, upon using monotonicity of costs in prices and 
also Shepherd’s lemma to develop expressions for demand elasticities,  
( , , ... ) ( , , ... ) ( , , ... ) ( , , ... ) 0.
i j m s
sign
A A B B
im js is jm P i j P i j P m s P m sc P P c P P c P P c P Pη η η η+ = ≥  (2.10) 
Stated formally,  
Corollary 1.2.  Under the assumptions in Proposition 1, suppose that the expenditure function 
for  is of weakly separable form .  Then an increase in 
the unit cost covariance across the mth and sth goods elicits an increase in the output covariance 
across the ith and jth goods, i.e., . 
( )U X [ ( , , ... ), ( , , ... ), ... ]A Bi j m sC c P P c P P
Cov / Cov 0x cij ms∂ ∂ ≥
 
The inference is somewhat surprising; no conditions are placed on the sign of 2 / A BC c c∂ ∂ ∂ .  
One way of viewing the corollary is with reference to part (a) of Corollary 1.1.  Good pair 
, being in the same partitioned set, could be viewed as constituents of the group ( , )m s B  
composite good.  An increase in correlation between unit costs for the mth and sth goods may be 
viewed as an increase in variance of the unit cost of composite good B .  Upon providing a 
similar interpretation for good pair , the lemma may be viewed as asserting that an increase 
in the variance of unit costs for composite good 
( , )i j
B  increases the variance of firm outputs for 
composite good A .  
The other situation directly places restrictions on demand responses.  Suppose that goods 
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are all substitutes in demand in the sense of 0 , ,ms MB m s m s≥ ∀ ∈Ω ≠ .8  This would, by itself, 
be supportive of an industry complex in which most firms tend toward specialization in a 
particular product.  Then equation (2.8) reveals that Cov / Cov 0x cij ms∂ ∂ ≥  whenever .  
This is because the outputs in question differ from the unit costs in question.  Firms with high 
(low) mth and sth unit costs tend to have high (low) ith and jth outputs.  Each of the output 
responses will be in the same direction, but the response we are considering is the covariation 
between the ith and jth outputs.  An increase in covariance between the mth and sth unit costs 
will act to better align the responses of the ith and jth outputs across firms and so will strengthen 
the covariation between the ith and jth outputs.  
, { ,i j m s∉ }
Suppose, on the other hand, that all goods complement ( 0imη < ) in demand.  Then equation 
(2.8) reveals that  for everyCov / Cov 0x cij ms∂ ∂ ≥  four-index combination.  In this situation, each 
of the output responses will be in the opposite direction, i.e., firms with high (low) mth and sth 
unit costs tend to have low (high) ith and jth outputs.  Again, an increase in covariance between 
the mth and sth unit costs will act to better align the responses of the ith and jth outputs across 
firms.  So while the signs of output responses to unit costs differ when comparing substitutes 
and complements, for second moment comparative statics what matters is how cost innovations 
affect the alignment between outputs.  That has more to do with whether the outputs under 
consideration are consistent in their responses than the nature of those responses. 
A final point to note concerns when unit costs are associated so that Co , v 0cms Mm≥ ∀ ∈Ω
Ms∀ ∈Ω .9  Then , when goods Cov Cov 0 ,
M M
x c
ij im js ms M Mm s
B B i j∈Ω ∈Ω= ≥ ∀ ∈∑ ∑ Ω ∀ ∈Ω
                                                 
8 An example of an industry where firms with large market shares are involved in plural markets 
such that substitution in demand is almost certain is meat packing in the United States (Moschini, 
Moro, and Green, 1994) and elsewhere. 
9 A vector  of random variables is said to have the association property if, for any pair of 
increasing functions  and , C  holds.  Clearly, this implies uniformly 
positive pair-wise correlation, which is all we require.  Affiliation, a standard assumption in 
auction theory, is implied by association.  See Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007) on association. 
z
( )a z ( )b z ov( ( ), ( )) 0a z b z ≥
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complement in demand.  So a system-wide positive covariance among unit costs implies a 
system-wide positive output covariance whenever demand also exhibits system-wide 
complementarity.  But cost association is insufficient to sign Cov xij  when goods substitute in 
demand because own-price effects confound matters.  
 
3.  Welfare 
Turning to industry profit effects, mean firm profit is  
 * * ,* * * *1
1 1( ) ; ( , ... , ) .
M N M
ind
n n tr
m m m m Mm n m
U X X c x X X X
N N N
π π ∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω≡ = − =∑ ∑ ∑  (3.1) 
In deviations form, use covariance relation 1 2 1 2 1 2[ ] [ ] [ ] Cov( ,E z z E z E z z z )= +  to write (3.1) as  
 0 ,* 0 * *1 1; ( )
N M M M
n n
m m m m m mn m m m
U X X c x
N N
π π ε δ π∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω= − = −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ * ;  (3.2) 
where mc  and 
*
mx  are the mth entries for the relevant average value vectors as defined under 
(2.5) above.  Insertion of (2.5) into (3.2) leads to  
 
0
0 0
1
1 Cov ,
N M M
M M N M M
n n
m ms sn m s
n n cm
ms m s ms msm s n m s
s
B
N
XB
N P
π π ε ε
0π ε ε π η π
∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω
∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω
= −
= − = − ≥
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
 (3.3) 
where concavity of  ensures ( )U X 0
M M
n
m ms sm s
Bε ε∈Ω ∈Ω n ≤∑ ∑ .  Inspection of (3.3) supports 
Proposition 2.  Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, an increase in the value of unit cost 
covariance Cov  has the following effect on average firm profit and so on social welfare:  cms
(a) increases it whenever the mth and sth goods are direct complements ( 0msη < );  
(b) decreases it whenever the mth and sth goods are direct substitutes ( 0msη > ).  
 
From (a) it is seen that an increase in any unit cost variance increases profits regardless of the 
number of goods.  So the standard result in Bergstrom and Varian (1985) and Salant and Shaffer 
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(1999) continues to apply in our multi-product setting.  As for covariance effects, when the sums 
of unit costs remain fixed and outputs remain interior then consumer surplus is invariant to the 
change in covariance.  Lower industry costs, therefore, imply that overall welfare increases 
(decreases) with an increase in Cov  when cms ( ) 0msη < > .  A closely related result was developed 
in Lapan and Hennessy (2006) for two- and three-product Cournot oligopolies.  There it was 
assumed that a change in covariance was arrived at through inter-firm rearrangements of unit 
costs that were tailored to leave the marginal distributions of unit costs unaffected.  
In order to better understand the implications of the preceding results, consider an 
innovation (or set of innovations) that can reduce the unit cost sums of producing good one by 
μ .  The adoption of this innovation shifts the unit cost vector for firm n in industry 1 from  to 1nc
1 1
n nc s μ− , where .  For the case in which this innovation benefits only one firm, say 
firm k, then .  The question is how equilibrium is affected by which firm adopts 
(or purchases) the innovation. 
1 1
N
n
n
s∈Ω =∑
1 0
ns n= ∀ ≠ k
Since summed unit costs will be the same regardless of which firms’ costs are reduced, 
provided all firms remain active, the equilibrium price and aggregate output will not be affected 
by which firms adopt the innovation.  In the case of a single product it was shown in earlier 
work (e.g., Bergstrom and Varian, 1985) that, given unit cost sums, any increase in the variance 
of the cost vector will result in (i) lower industry production costs and (ii) higher variance of 
firm outputs.  Thus, the industry cost reduction will be maximized if the most efficient firm 
experiences the unit cost reduction, and this will also lead to the largest variance in firm outputs.  
We inquire into whether similar results hold in the multi-product model. 
Consider two cases concerning how the benefits of the innovation are distributed; 
Case I: the nth firm unit cost of good 1 is 1 1
n nc s μ−  , and 
Case II: the nth firm unit cost of good 1 is 1 1ˆ
n nc s μ− . 
Let nmε , with n nm mc cε ≡ − m  as in (2.5), denote the deviation of firm n’s unit cost in industry m 
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prior to adoption of the innovation.  Let nmε  and ˆnmε  represent the deviation after the innovation, 
for cases I and II respectively.  By construction, ˆn nm m
n
mε ε ε= =  for all 1m ≠ , while 1 1n n 1nε ε ω= +   
and 1 1 1ˆ ,
n n nˆε ε ω= +  where 1 1( / )n nN sω μ μ≡ −   and 1 1ˆ ˆ( / )n nN sω μ μ≡ − .  Hence, 1 1ˆn nε ε− =  
1 1ˆ(
n ns s )μ−  and  for all ˆ 0n nm mε ε− = 1m ≠ . 
Using (2.5), a firm’s output deviation for each good under each scenario is given by: 
 ( ) ( )1 1 1
ˆ ˆˆ; ;
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ .
M
M
n n n n n n
i i i im m i i i im mm
n n n n n n n n
i i i i im m m im
x x B x x B
x x B B s s
μ μ μ μ
μ μ
Mm
δ ε δ
δ δ ε ε μ
∈Ω ∈Ω
∈Ω
≡ − = ≡ − =
− = − = − = −
∑ ∑
∑
 
  
ε
 (3.4) 
In (3.4), ix
μ  denotes the average output of each good after the cost shift.  Since the unit cost sum 
has changed, the values of the imB  change relative to when the industry 1 mean unit cost was 1c .  
However, the new msB  are the same under Case I as under Case II because summed unit costs 
are the same.  We label the new values of the imB  as msB
μ  so as to recognize that these values 
will, in general, depend upon μ .  Since aggregate industry outputs, and hence prices, are the 
same under cases I and II, the only source of welfare difference between the two scenarios will 
be due to the difference in industry costs.  
To illustrate cases I and II, assume the entire cost reduction accrues to one firm, as when the 
innovation is excludable and protected by intellectual property rights.  In Case I, assume firm a 
gets the cost reduction so that  with 1 1
as = 1 0ns =  for n a≠ .  In Case II, firm b gets the cost 
reduction so that  with  for 1ˆ 1
bs = 1ˆ 0ns = n b≠  and b a≠ .  So 1 1ˆ 1n ns s− =  for ,  
for n , and  otherwise.  Let  denote total costs under Case II less total 
costs under Case I, and let  represent the difference in the covariance of outputs 
across the two cases.  Work in the appendix shows that 
n a= 1 1ˆ 1n ns s− = −
b= 1 1ˆ 0n ns s− = II ITC−Δ
CovII I xij
−Δ
 
( )
( )
, 1
1
, 1 1
1
2 ;
Cov .
M
M
II I a b
t t t t
t
II I x a b
tij it j i jt t t
t
TC B
B B B B
μ
μ μ μ μ
μ ε ε
μ ε ε
−
∈Ω
≠
−
∈Ω
≠
Δ = −
⎡ ⎤Δ = + −⎣ ⎦
∑
∑  (3.5) 
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These equations confirm: 
Lemma 1.  Let firm b be the low cost producer of good 1, or 1 1 0
a bε ε− > .  Assigning the cost 
reduction to firm b may not result in a greater reduction in total costs if either (i) goods are 
substitutes ( 1 0 ,t M 1B t t
μ > ∀ ∈Ω ≠ ) and firm b is also the low cost producer of the other goods, 
or (ii) goods are complements and firm a is the low cost producer of the other goods.   
 
To understand what happens in either of situations (i) and (ii), consider Case II.  Even though 
more of good 1 is produced by the lower cost producer, the changes in other outputs across 
firms cause more of those goods to be produced by the higher cost producer.   
Turning to the covariance difference in (3.5), when comparing output variances we can 
write: 
 ( ) ( ),1 1
1
Var 2 .
M
II I x a b II I
tii i it t t i
t
B B Bμ μ μμ ε ε− ∈Ω
≠
Δ = − = Δ∑ TC−  (3.6) 
Thus, for the special rearrangement of a cost reduction that was considered here, the difference 
in output variance can be related to the difference in output costs.  When  then this is the 
efficiency result in Bergstrom and Varian (1985), albeit for multi-product oligopoly.  
1i =
 
4.  Welfare under higher costs and quadratic preference structure 
Even within the single market setting, special demand functions, such as linear demand, are 
widely used when seeking to understand how cost shocks might affect welfare (Vives, 1999; 
Grossman, 2007; Wang and Zhao, 2007).  In this section we will look at what can be said about 
welfare if one is willing to accept additional structure.  We have not to this point imposed 
specific structure on .  We didn’t have to because interior solutions in the presence of 
constant unit costs ensured constant aggregate outputs.  Now we seek to understand 
consequences of shifts in mean unit costs so that, inevitably, aggregate outputs will change. 
( )U X
In order to obtain some further insights when firms have heterogeneous costs, we will 
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henceforth restrict attention to the quadratic preference structure:  
  (4.1) 0( ) 0.5 ,
M M M
m m ms m sm m s
U X A A X A X X∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω= + +∑ ∑ ∑
where the double summation is a negative definite quadratic form, i.e., has  values such that 
the form’s Hessian is a negative definite matrix.  The inverse demand functions are 
msA
( )m mP X A=  
M
ms ss
A X∈Ω+∑  for all Mm∈Ω .  We have then: 
Proposition 3.  Under the assumptions of Proposition 1 and, in addition, quadratic  then 
(a) a firm-invariant increase in the unit cost of good 1 reduces industry profits and consumer 
welfare. 
( )U X
In addition, an increase in some firms’ (say firm 1) unit cost of good 1 (b) decreases 
consumer surplus; (c) increases (decreases) industry profits if ,* *1 1/ ( ) 1/(
nx X N 1)< > + ; and (d) 
increases (decreases) welfare if ,* *1 1/ ( ) 2 /(
nx X N 1)< > + .  
 
This proposition extends findings in Zhao (2001) to the multi-product setting.  Interestingly, 
the share bounds he identified for a single good oligopoly are as in parts (c) and (d) above; i.e., 
interactions in demand do not affect these share bounds.  The key insight is that an adverse cost 
shock to a large share firm is worse for industry profits than an adverse cost shock to a small 
share firm if the set of active firms remains the same after the shock.  The general intuition has 
been developed extensively in earlier work for a single output market, see Février and Linnemer 
(2004) and papers referenced therein.  We have shown that, for quadratic preferences at least, 
Zhao’s specific bounds extend to multi-product oligopoly.10  Other sector costs do matter, of 
course, because they determine the values of ,*1
nx  and *1X .  But 
,* *
1 /
n
1x X  is a sufficient summary 
statistic. 
                                                 
10 We leave it to the interested reader to consider unit cost shocks of form γ  that map  
.  Correlation analogs of Proposition 3 in Février and Linnemer (2004) can then be 
n n
m mc c→ +
( )m nmk cγ
 13
 5.  Conclusion 
We have extended the literature on relationships between the distributions of unit costs, unit 
cost innovations, equilibrium actions and welfare measures in multi-product Cournot oligopoly.  
It is not surprising that the nature of interactions in preferences between consumed goods is 
prominent in these relationships.  Sometimes though, such as when a unit cost increase improves 
welfare given quadratic utility, the nature of interactions is of little consequence. 
                                                                                                                                                             
* 0arrived at under linear demand, or Θ =  in their notation. 
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Reader’s Appendix 
Establishing Equation (2.5):  
Using the A  matrix inverted in (2.2), producer optimality conditions (2.4), and , the nth 
firm’s optimality conditions may be written as  
mU P= m
.  (A1) 
,*
1 11 1
,*
2 2,* ,* 2 2
,*
; ; ;
n n
n n
n n n n
n n
M MM M
P Ux c
P Ux c
Ax c P x c P
P Ux c
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟= − = = = =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
# ## #
Upon aggregation across firms, using (A1), market equilibrium must satisfy  
 
*
1 1
*
* * 2
*
1 1; ;
sum
sum
sum
M M
X C
X
Ax c P x c
N N
X C
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟= − = =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
# #
2 ;
C
N
n
m mn
 (A2) 
where * ,*x∈Ω=∑ N and sum nm mnC c∈Ω=X ∑ .  We see from (A2) that if both the number of 
active firms and the average unit cost for each product are held fixed, then the per-household 
mean consumption vector * /N x H  does not change and each household’s utility does not 
change.  Subtract (A2) from (A1).  Then invert matrix A , as in (2.2), to obtain (2.5).  
 
Proof of Proposition 3.  First note that equilibrium consumer surplus is  
* *
0 0.5 ;
M M
ms m sm s
CS A A X X∈Ω ∈Ω= − ∑ ∑  (B1) 
equilibrium industry profits is 
* * *
*
0
( )
;
( ) 2 2 ( )
M M M
M M N
M M M N
ind
m m m ms m sm m s
n n
ms m sm s n
n n
m m m ms m sm m s
A c X A X X
B
A c X A CS B
π
ε ε
;
n
ε ε
∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω
∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω
∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω
= − +
−
= − + − × −
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
 (B2) 
and equilibrium welfare is  
 1
* *
0 ( ) 0.5
.
M M
M M N
m m m ms mm m s
n n
ms m sm s n
W A A c X A X X
B ε ε
∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω
∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω
= + − +
−
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
*
M
s
N∈Ω
.M
 (B3) 
Part (a): Work out equilibrium surpluses by using Nash private optimality conditions: 
* ,* 0, , .
M M
n n
m ms s ms s m Ms s
A A X A x c m n∈Ω ∈Ω+ + − = ∀ ∈Ω ∀∑ ∑  (B4) 
Aggregate to establish  
*( 1) 0,
M N
n
m ms s ms n
NA N A X c m∈Ω ∈Ω+ + − = ∀ ∈Ω∑ ∑  (B5) 
Invert to obtain 
* ( )
1 Mm ms s ss
NX B c A
N ∈Ω
= − ∀+ ∑ .Mm∈Ω  (B6) 
From (B1) and (B6),  
*
* *
1
1 1
* * *
1 2 1
1
(1) (0) ... 0,
1 1
M M M M
s
m ms m msm s m s
dXdCS N
sX A Xd c d c N
N NX X X
N N
∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω= − = − +
⎡ ⎤= − + + + = − <⎣ ⎦+ +
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ A B
 (B7) 
where use has been made of the fact that 1B A−= .   
For the effect on equilibrium industry profits, differentiate (B2) while using (B6) and (B7):  
*
*
1
1 1 1
* *
1 1 1
( ) 2
2( ) 2
1 1
M
M
ind
m
m mm
m m mm
dXd dCSX A c
d c d c d c
N NX A c B X
N N
π
∈Ω
∈Ω
= − + − −
= − + − + = − <+ +
∑
∑ *1 0.1 XN +
 (B8) 
Part (b): This follows immediately from (B1) and (B7) since only average costs enter 
consumer surplus. 
Part (c): Note first that 11 1/ 1/d c dc N= .  From (B2) and (B8),  
1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
*
11
1
( )(
2 2 ( ).
( 1)
M M N
M
ind ind
n n
ms m m s sm s n
s s ss
cd )B c c c c
dc c c c
X B c c
N N
π π
∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω
∈Ω
∂∂ ∂ ⎡ ⎤= − − −⎣ ⎦∂ ∂ ∂
= − − −+
∑ ∑ ∑
∑
 (B9) 
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Use (B4) and (B5) to obtain ,* * / (
M
n n
m m ms ss
)sx X N B c c∈Ω− = −∑  so that  
* * *
,* ,* *1 1 1 1
1 11 *
1 1
12 2 2 2 2
( 1) 1 1
nind
n nX X X xd ,*
1 .x xdc N N N N N X
π ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= − − − = − = −⎜⎜ ⎟+ + +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ X⎟  (B10) 
Finally, using (B7) and (B10), find 
* ,*
* *1 1 1
1 11 1 1 * *
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 12 2
1 1 2( 1)
n nindc X x xdW CS d ,*1X X
dc c c dc N N X N X
π ⎛ ⎞ ⎛∂∂= + = − + − = −⎜ ⎟ ⎜∂ ∂ + + +⎝ ⎠ ⎝
⎞⎟⎠
 (B11) 
to demonstrate part (d).    Q 
 
Establishing Relations (3.5):  
Use of (3.2) and (3.4) provides 
 ( )ˆˆ ˆ .
N M N M M
II I n n n n n n n n
i i i i s sm m s sm mn i n s m
TC B Bμ μˆε δ ε δ ε ε ε ε− ∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω ⎡ ⎤Δ = − = −⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
s s
μ
 (C1) 
In light of , (C1) simplifies to: ˆ 1n nm m mε ε= ∀ ≠
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ) ( ){ }
2 2
,11 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
2 2
,11 1 1 1 1 1
1
2 2
,11 1 1 1 1 1
1
ˆ ˆ2
ˆ ˆ2
ˆ ˆ2
M
N N
M
N N
M
N N
II I n n n n n n
t t t t tn n t
n n n n n
t t tn n t
n n n n n
t t tn n t
TC B B B
B B
B B
μ μ
μ μ
μ μ
ε ε ε ε
ε ε ε ε ε
ε ε μ ε
− ∈Ω∈Ω ∈Ω ≠
∈Ω∈Ω ∈Ω ≠
∈Ω∈Ω ∈Ω ≠
⎡ ⎤ ε ε⎡ ⎤Δ = − + −⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
 
  
   .
 
n
m
 (C2) 
Similarly, upon remembering that ˆn nm mε ε ε= =  for all 1m ≠ , 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2
,1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
2 2
1 1 1 1
1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆCov
1 1ˆ ˆ
1 ˆ
N N M M
M
N N
N
II I x n n n n n n n n
ij i j i j it jk t k t kn n t k
n n n n n
ti j it j i jt tn n t
n n
i j n
B B
N N
B B B B B B
N N
B B B
N N
μ μ
μ μ μ μ μ μ
μ μ
δ δ δ δ ε ε ε ε
ε ε ε ε ε
με ε
−
∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω
∈Ω∈Ω ∈Ω ≠
∈Ω
Δ = − = −
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − + +⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
∑
   
 
 ( ), 1 1 1 1
1
ˆ .
M
N
n n n
t it j i jt tn t
B B B s sμ μ μ μ ε∈Ω∈Ω ≠ ⎡ ⎤+ −⎣ ⎦∑ ∑  
− 
j
 (C3) 
In the case of only one good, or where there are no market interactions ( ), 
(C2) and (C3) show that , so an increase in the variance of 
costs must increase the variance of outputs and decrease total costs.  Hence, in this case, the 
0ijB i
μ = ∀ ≠
11sign{ } sign{ Cov }
II I II I xTC− −Δ = − Δ
 3
largest cost reductions are achieved when the most efficient firm in industry 1 adopts the 
innovation.  But when  then no such conclusion is possible. 0,ijB
μ ≠
When  for ,  for n1 1ˆ 1
n ns s− = n a= 1 1ˆ 1n ns s− = − b= , and 1 1ˆ 0n ns s− =  otherwise, then (C2) 
and (C3) simplify to (3.5).  Bear in mind when doing the algebra that the difference in squares 
cancels since the sum of squares is the same.  Also, the vector difference 1ˆ 1ε ε−   has zero entries 
apart from when n  and when n b . a= =
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